Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the statement by the President of the Security Council of 31 October 2001 (S/PRST/2001/30), in which the Council requested me to submit quarterly reports on the situation in Somalia. The report covers developments since my previous report, dated 17 November 2008 (S/2008/709), and focuses, in particular, on political developments and progress made in the Djibouti peace process. The report includes relevant information on peacebuilding efforts and the security, humanitarian and human rights situations, as well as the operational activities of the United Nations agencies and programmes in Somalia. As requested by the Council in paragraphs 5 and 6 of its resolution 1863 (2009), the report also outlines progress made towards the strengthening of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), support to the Somali security and rule-of-law institutions and contingency planning for the possible deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation.

II. Main developments in Somalia

A. Political developments

2. Since my previous report, there have been a number of developments in Somalia, notably the resignation of the President, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, and the subsequent election of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as his successor.

3. In line with the commitments made under the Djibouti agreement, on 26 October 2008 members of the Transitional Federal Government and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) adopted, at a meeting of the High-level Committee, a joint declaration on the establishment of a unity Government and an inclusive Parliament. In November 2008, the High-level Committee agreed on further modalities to enhance political cooperation. To this end, the two parties established a working group to engage on details of the unity structures.

4. In November 2008, the Joint Security Committee developed detailed proposals to strengthen the work of the High-level Committee, in particular with respect to the implementation of the agreement on the cessation of armed confrontation, signed on 26 October 2008. The Joint Security Committee established a working group for the integration and realignment of the Somali Police Force and agreed to develop
detailed plans for the formation of interim joint security forces and command structures. The Joint Security Committee also agreed to establish a verification and monitoring mission, with headquarters in Mogadishu, to promote a comprehensive ceasefire. However, lack of financial and logistical support is delaying progress in all areas. Immediate support for the Somali Police Force and the Joint Security Force is vital to securing the political and security gains made in the peace process.

5. Early in December, members of ARS, led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, returned to Mogadishu for the first time in two years to commence the implementation of the Djibouti agreement. The delegation was warmly received at Mogadishu airport by representatives of the Transitional Federal Government, ARS supporters and the local population.

6. President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed formally announced his resignation in a statement which he delivered before Parliament and Cabinet members in Baidoa on 29 December 2008. The President said that he was resigning to avoid being seen as an “obstacle to peace” in Somalia.

7. Following the resignation of the President, the Speaker of Parliament, Sheikh Adan Madobe, assumed the presidency in an acting capacity, in line with article 45 of the Transitional Federal Charter, which empowers Parliament to elect a new President within 30 days. On 12 January, the Speaker announced the formation of the Parliamentary Committee for the Presidential Election, which was given the task of overseeing the election of a new President.

8. On 26 January, the Transitional Federal Parliament voted in favour of an expansion by 275 seats, with 200 seats allocated to ARS and the remaining 75 reserved for members of civil society, businesspeople, women, the diaspora and other opposition groups. On 27 January, the Transition Federal Parliament adopted a motion to amend the Transitional Federal Charter in order to extend its mandate for two years, until August 2011. Subsequently, the new ARS members of Parliament were sworn in.

9. During the negotiations, my Special Representative, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, appealed to the Somali parties to eschew the concept of “winner takes all” and seek compromise to end the long-running conflict in the country.

10. On 30 January, after two rounds of voting in Djibouti, the expanded Parliament elected the Chairman of ARS, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, as the country’s new interim President, and he was sworn in on 31 January. In his inaugural speech, the President vowed to build an inclusive Government, extend a hand to hard-line armed groups still opposed to the peace talks and bring Somalia back into the regional fold. Following his inauguration, the President attended the African Union Summit held in Addis Ababa from 2 to 4 February.

11. The international community has since welcomed the election of President Ahmed and expressed its readiness to cooperate with his Government in its effort to bring about peace and stability in Somalia.

12. On 13 February, the President appointed Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke as the new Prime Minister. The appointment was endorsed by the 475-seat Parliament by 410 votes to 9, with 2 abstentions. On 20 February, the Prime Minister announced the formation of the new 36-member Cabinet, which Parliament
endorsed on 21 February. On 23 February, President Ahmed returned to Mogadishu, with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet expected to follow suit.

Other developments

13. In November 2008, the Government of Ethiopia announced its intention to start withdrawing its forces from Somalia by the end of the year. On 13 January 2009, Ethiopian forces vacated the following locations in northern Mogadishu: the pasta factory, Carafat neighbourhood, Hayle Barise building and Towfiq intersection. The forces completed their withdrawal from all locations in Mogadishu two days later. Subsequently, the Transitional Federal Government and ARS issued a joint statement in which they called on the United Nations to deploy peacekeepers in Somalia. In the statement they also announced that “the two parties to the Djibouti agreement are working on a joint security initiative as Ethiopian troops withdraw”.

14. Following the Ethiopian withdrawal from Somalia, traditional leaders of the Mudulood, the dominant Hawiye sub-clan in Mogadishu, reportedly warned that they would not tolerate the continuation of the insurgency. The elders and religious leaders in Mogadishu urged residents to bury their differences and work towards the attainment of total peace in the country. Women’s groups in Mogadishu are said to have added their voice to the elders’ appeal against attacking the AMISOM troops.

15. The Al-Shabaab insurgent group, which opposes the Djibouti process, has taken control of Baidoa. The takeover was carried out peacefully through negotiation with the clans. However, the fall of Baidoa and the seizure of the Parliament building is a setback for the newly expanded Transitional Federal Parliament, which is unlikely to return to Baidoa in the short term.

16. Al-Shabaab did not, however, overrun the country following the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops as had been feared. A number of new militias, which are either clan- or religion-based, such as the Al-Sunna wa-al-Jamaa, have emerged and are opposing Al-Shabaab, which is reported to command little popular support. Nevertheless, Al-Shabaab has vowed to continue with the insurgency and reiterated its opposition to the peace process.

17. The withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia has put further pressure on the AMISOM troops, which continue to provide security at vital installations, including the airport, the seaport and the presidential palace. However, AMISOM will not be able to expand its area of operations or fully execute its mandate until it has been strengthened in line with Security Council resolution 1863 (2009), and it is likely to remain the focus of insurgent attacks by Al-Shabaab.

18. On 8 January 2009, “Puntland” elected Abdirahman Muhammad Farole as its new President. Mr. Farole addressed a letter to my Special Representative on 22 January, in which he reaffirmed the continued support of “Puntland” for any “legitimate, meaningful and representative reconciliation of the Somali people”. In the same letter, he regretted that “Puntland” was not adequately represented in the United Nations-sponsored reconciliation process. In response, my Special Representative informed Mr. Farole that “Puntland” was welcome to join the process and that UNPOS was ready to facilitate the participation of its representatives. Mr. Farole welcomed the appointment of President Sharif Ahmed and pledged to work with the new Administration.
B. Security situation

19. The security situation in Somalia remained volatile during the reporting period. Insurgent forces gained control over additional towns and territory, although they are increasingly facing armed resistance from clans and other local militias. Ethiopian forces completed their withdrawal from Mogadishu on 15 January, and the last troop contingents were reported to have crossed from Somalia into Ethiopia on 25 January.

20. Although widespread fighting in Mogadishu as a result of the Ethiopian withdrawal did not materialize, neither ARS nor the Transitional Federal Government forces were able to deploy immediately into all the areas vacated by Ethiopian troops, as had originally been planned. Clan militias moved swiftly into strategic positions in northern Mogadishu, and clan elders were able to contain the security situation through negotiations. Upon his return to Mogadishu on 7 February, President Ahmed engaged clan and insurgent leaders in an attempt to address immediate security concerns. However, insurgent attacks against AMISOM intensified following the withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces; eight significant attacks against AMISOM troops have been reported since mid-January, including several roadside bomb attacks and one suicide bombing. Although AMISOM maintains that its troops reacted with restraint, local media reported that disproportionate responses resulted in the deaths of civilians. The deadliest of the attacks on AMISOM occurred on 22 February, killing 11 Burundian peacekeepers and injuring others. The AMISOM positions at the seaport and airport remain highly vulnerable to mortar fire from surrounding elevated areas, which presents a considerable risk for the Mission’s supply line.

21. Beyond Mogadishu, insurgent forces have consolidated their presence in the Lower Shabelle region and expanded further into the Bay and Gedo regions. Al-Shabaab took control of the seaport town of Merka in December 2008; its forces stormed the compounds of humanitarian agencies, including the World Food Programme (WFP) office, where they disarmed the guards, stole communications equipment and cash and held several national staff at gunpoint. At the beginning of January, reports were received from Kismayo indicating that Al-Shabaab militias had arrested up to 30 people in a raid targeting local non-governmental organizations. Since December 2008, Al-Shabaab forces in other regions have met with increasing opposition from local clans. In the Galgaduud region in January 2009, the Al-Sunna wa-al-Jamaa engaged Al-Shabaab militias in intense fighting, reportedly killing at least 35 people and injuring more than 60 in Dhusamareeb. The latest reports indicate that Al-Shabaab forces have been expelled from most towns in the Galgaduud region. On 25 January, immediately following the withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces from Baidoa, widespread looting was reported after the Transitional Federal Government militia left the town, until Al-Shabaab took control though negotiation with local clan elders.

22. In light of the extreme risks, and given the continuing direct attacks against humanitarian workers, the United Nations was forced to further reduce personnel and programme activity. In January 2009, two WFP staff were murdered in separate incidents at food distribution sites, increasing to eight the total number of United Nations staff killed in the past 12 months. One United Nations staff member remains in captivity after having been taken hostage in June 2008.
III. African Union Mission in Somalia

23. In line with the provisions of the agreement between the Transitional Federal Government and ARS on the cessation of armed confrontation, AMISOM has been able to successfully assist the joint security forces of the two parties in taking control of the areas vacated by the Ethiopian troops.

24. Despite the fact that pledges have been made and financial and logistical support received from a number of countries, the resources available fall far short of AMISOM requirements for the full deployment and sustenance of its operations. The African Union has appealed to the Security Council for political, financial and logistical support for AMISOM. A number of countries, notably Uganda, Burundi and Nigeria, have indicated the availability of troops for deployment with AMISOM, but have been unable to take action in this regard owing to the lack of the necessary facilities.

25. As a follow-up to resolution 1863 (2009), a United Nations multidisciplinary assessment mission travelled to the region to assess the logistical, security and other operational conditions in Somalia, as well as the current support capacity of the African Union forces. The mission further developed proposals for international support for Somalia. It travelled to Addis Ababa for consultations with senior officials of the African Union and the Government of Ethiopia.

26. The African Union will continue to work closely with the Secretariat’s planners team in Addis Ababa for force generation and logistical, administrative, financial and other arrangements that are necessary for the continued deployment of AMISOM and its transition to a United Nations peacekeeping operation.

IV. Findings of the technical assessment mission

27. In its resolution 1863 (2009), the Security Council approved the next steps on the security track in Somalia, which were set out in my letter of 19 December 2008 (S/2008/804). They consist of (a) a package to support AMISOM so that it can sustain its operations; (b) assistance in building the security and rule-of-law institutions of Somalia, in particular the joint security and police forces established under the Djibouti process; (c) the enhancement of the capacity of UNPOS to enable it effectively to support the peace process; and (d) the further development of contingency planning for a United Nations peacekeeping operation, including the definition of conditions that would allow such a deployment to succeed. In its resolution 1863 (2009), the Council also requested me to report by 30 January on the details of the proposed logistics support package for AMISOM, as well as on the implementation of the plans contained in my letter of 19 December regarding support to the Somali security and rule-of-law institutions, and to provide, by 15 April, a report on a possible United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia, including recommendations on its mandate and tasks.

28. With a view to developing detailed plans for all of those requests, the Secretariat dispatched a technical assessment mission, led jointly by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNPOS, to Addis Ababa and Nairobi to hold consultations among the African Union, UNPOS and the United Nations country team, the Joint Security Committee, major donors and other relevant actors. The findings of the mission in the areas identified by the Council are set out below.
29. Owing to security considerations, it was not possible for the technical assessment mission to visit Mogadishu. However, members of the Joint Security Committee who had travelled from Somalia, as well as the AMISOM Force Commander and senior Ethiopian military officials, shared with the Mission their assessment of the security and political situation on the ground. The Secretariat will make a renewed attempt to dispatch a small assessment team to Mogadishu before I report to the Council in April, as requested in paragraph 5 of resolution 1863 (2009).

A. Support to the African Union Mission in Somalia

30. The technical assessment mission held extensive consultations with the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union, his senior staff, the Special Representative of the African Union for Somalia and the AMISOM Force Commander, as well as with donors and other stakeholders. The mission’s recommendations with respect to the needs of AMISOM and proposed support mechanisms were set out in detail in my letter of 30 January to the President of the Security Council (S/2009/60). That letter described the proposed logistics package, to be funded from assessed contributions, and identified needs that should be met through voluntary contributions to the trust fund established by the Council. It also highlighted military requirements that will need to be met through bilateral assistance from Member States.

31. In order to manage the package of assistance to AMISOM, the technical assessment mission recommended the establishment of a dedicated and independent field support headquarters, which would be located in Nairobi but would, as soon as security conditions permit, deploy elements in Mogadishu to act as an interface with the AMISOM headquarters and ensure delivery of support, including that provided by commercial contractors. A small liaison element would be located in Addis Ababa together with existing United Nations structures for support to the African Union. This structure would facilitate planning for the transition from AMISOM to a United Nations peacekeeping operation at the appropriate time. As requested in resolution 1863 (2009), United Nations planners co-located with the African Union will remain in place, although the team should be streamlined to avoid duplication of functions.

B. Assistance in building the Somali security and rule-of-law institutions

32. The transitional security arrangements established by the Somali parties under the Djibouti process comprise three key institutions: the Joint Security Committee, the Joint Security Force and the Somali Police Force. The role of the institutions is to deliver on the aims of the Djibouti agreement, including promoting a peaceful environment and facilitating protection of civilians and delivery of humanitarian assistance. The technical assessment mission stressed that international assistance to the Joint Security Committee, the Joint Security Force and the Somali Police Force should be focused on contributing to those goals and proceed on the basis of an adequate political framework, accountability in the area of human rights, inclusive recruitment and sustainable funding. In addition, the building of those institutions should lay the foundation for a long-term, nationally owned security sector
architecture and strategy. Efforts should be made to ensure that there are civilian oversight mechanisms and capacity in the justice and prisons systems.

33. The technical assessment mission recommendations are aimed at enhancing the capacity of UNPOS to support the Djibouti process, coordinate with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and assist in the development of the security sector, human rights, justice and corrections, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and mine action. They also reflect the assistance required from bilateral partners in developing the transitional security institutions of Somalia. Across the sector, the mission recognized that significant activity had already been carried out by UNDP through its Rule of Law and Security Programme and that additional activity should complement existing projects and avoid duplication.

34. The recommendations should form the basis for the enhancement of UNPOS and an appeal to donors for the trust fund envisaged in resolution 1863 (2009).

35. It should be noted that the full implementation of the actions recommended by the technical assessment mission would require international staff to be deployed in Somalia in greater numbers, which is not permissible in the present security environment. Security improvements, progress in the peace process and a reduction in the risk to United Nations staff are preconditions for a gradual expansion of activities and access by United Nations staff to Mogadishu; conversely, the continuation or deterioration of current security conditions would require the re-evaluation and possible suspension of some envisaged programmes, although other critical elements could be implemented remotely, especially in the area of human rights.

Security sector reform

36. The development of a framework of governance for the security sector is a key objective for the promotion of stability in Somalia. While insecurity and lack of local capacity make full-scale security sector engagement problematic, the United Nations should be prepared from the outset to provide advice and assistance to the Somali parties on issues relating to security sector reform, including accountability, legal frameworks and oversight, and to plan for a national security sector assessment when conditions permit, in support of local authorities. The technical assessment mission therefore recommended the immediate deployment to UNPOS of an adviser in the area of security sector reform to provide strategic advice to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and senior staff, as well as to the Joint Security Committee and other relevant Somali counterparts.

Joint Security Committee and Joint Security Force

37. The most immediate priority set out by the technical assessment mission was the need to identify resources to support the operations of the Joint Security Committee and to sustain existing Transitional Federal Government and ARS forces in Mogadishu, which are securing locations vacated by Ethiopian forces. As a stopgap measure, AMISOM has stepped in to provide food, water and fuel, to be funded by bilateral partners. All interlocutors advised the mission that such a measure would be essential to prevent Desertion and the disintegration of the forces.

38. The technical assessment mission recommended that assistance focus on three priorities. First, there should be basic funding and logistical support to enable the...
Joint Security Committee to remain cohesive and function effectively in Mogadishu. In parallel, the United Nations should provide advice to enable the Committee to manage the Transitional Federal Government and ARS forces under its control, including in the areas of conducting registration, payment, recruitment/vetting and the formal integration of Transitional Federal Government and ARS forces into the 5,000-strong Joint Security Force provided for under the Djibouti process.

39. Secondly, the basic sustenance of existing Transitional Federal Government and ARS forces will remain essential in the short term until the Joint Security Force is established and functioning. Some donors have indicated a willingness to continue to channel support through AMISOM. However, the payment of stipends is a critical outstanding issue. Donors have requested the United Nations to assist in putting in place a mechanism that would ensure the transparent use of funds by the African Union in this regard. The technical assessment mission recommended that that be delivered through a consultancy.

40. Thirdly, following the establishment of the Joint Security Force, UNPOS will facilitate discussions between the Joint Security Committee and bilateral partners aimed at identifying international partners able to assist the Somali parties in training and assisting the Joint Security Force, along the lines of the assistance provided in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Various models are possible, ranging from those involving training delivered entirely by a bilateral donor to those heavily reliant on delivery by AMISOM forces, with funding and equipment provided by donors. Pursuant to resolution 1863 (2009), a United Nations trust fund mechanism will be established, managed by UNPOS, to channel donor assistance to that process.

**Somali Police Force**

41. The Joint Security Committee, during its November 2008 workshop, held in Naivasha, Kenya, and facilitated by UNDP, decided to develop a 10,000-strong civilian police force under Somali law and up to international standards. At present, the internationally supported Somali Police Force consists of 2,770 police officers of the Transitional Federal Government trained under the UNDP Rule of Law and Security Programme. However, the police are badly in need of more equipment and basic infrastructure. The officers did not receive stipend payments during 2008; payments have now resumed on a retroactive basis, however. UNDP, in close cooperation with the African Union police contingent, has also restarted the training of trainers and is in the process of selecting 2,000 additional recruits for training within the next three months in Somalia, subject to confirmation of funding availability for stipend payment. The African Union police are assisting with monitoring, mentoring and advising trained officers who are still in service.

42. In the short term, the Somali Police Force needs advice, ongoing training and logistical support through a trust fund. An immediate challenge is to put in place mechanisms for civilian governance and accountability. Financial and administrative management will also be a priority. In the medium term, infrastructure and specialized police training will be essential; in the longer term, a full police reform and restructuring programme should be implemented in line with the national security sector strategy of Somalia.

43. The technical assessment mission stressed the need for the coordination of assistance among international actors, including UNDP, the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, the African Union and bilateral donors. In this regard, the mission recommended that the UNDP training programme should provide a basis for continued support to the Somali Police Force. Under a clear division of labour, UNDP will train an additional 4,000 officers in 2009, while AMISOM police will help the Joint Security Committee to register, advise and mentor trained police officers and develop plans for reform and restructuring. The African Union plans to deploy 270 police advisers and mentors to AMISOM for that purpose. Additional United Nations police advisers assigned to UNPOS, initially from the standing police capacity, will support AMISOM and provide advice to the Joint Security Committee. United Nations and African Union police experts will also support the conduct by the Joint Security Committee and the Somali Police Force of medium-term training-needs analysis.

Human rights

44. The technical assessment mission noted that the human rights situation in Somalia has been among the most neglected in the world, taking into consideration the extent of the atrocities that have been committed over the years. Human rights must remain a core issue on the agenda of the Djibouti peace process, as well as for the transitional institutions.

45. Within Somalia, the United Nations human rights presence currently consists of two Somali UNDP human rights advisers, deployed in Garowe (“Puntland”) and Hargeisa (“Somaliland”), whose role is to ensure the incorporation of human rights into UNDP programmes. UNPOS has a small Human Rights Unit currently deployed at its headquarters in Nairobi. The technical assessment mission recommended that that capacity be enhanced by the addition of three posts, with a focus on incorporating a human rights perspective into transitional security institutions and continuing the development of justice/accountability mechanisms in the context of the Djibouti process, including through civil society awareness-raising and the justice working group established in November 2008.

Justice and corrections

46. The recent worsening of the security and human rights situation in south-central Somalia has posed significant challenges in terms of international assistance to the Somali justice sector, as international staff have been evacuated from the area. Following the killing of several judges during 2008, the formal, secular justice system in Somalia has virtually broken down, although there are some reports of hearings held in Mogadishu and Baidoa. In 2008, UNDP provided assistance for judicial training, oversight and logistical support, and despite the current security situation, continues to support local legal providers in Baidoa and Mogadishu, as well as the law faculties of the two universities in Mogadishu. In conjunction with UNDP, UNPOS has initiated contacts with Somali judicial authorities on human rights standards. However, plans to rehabilitate court infrastructure have been suspended for security reasons. Given the increasing importance of justice institutions and capacity in advancing the peace process, the technical assessment mission recommended deploying one judicial affairs adviser to UNPOS to provide technical advice to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and to develop plans for future programme activity, in close coordination with UNDP.
47. With regard to the corrections system, years of conflict and mismanagement, combined with very poor infrastructure, have resulted in deplorable prison conditions in Somalia. Prisons generally lack basic medical facilities and equipment, as well as water and sanitation, and fail to meet the minimum standards required under the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners of 1955. There is a risk of a deepening human rights crisis within the prison system, although the mission also noted the willingness of the Somali parties to accept international support, especially in the areas of the training of national prisons staff and the improvement of prison infrastructure, including prison security. The mission recommended the deployment of one corrections adviser to UNPOS to develop contacts with national actors, provide advice to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and work to develop a joint cooperation framework with UNDP, which has conducted prison assessments and facilitated the reconstruction of some prisons in south-central Somalia, Hargeisa (“Somaliland”) and Gardo (“Puntland”).

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

48. The implementation of sustainable programmes to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate the various armed groups in Somalia and to control weapons in the hands of civilians are essential for the establishment of a lasting peace. The planning and establishment of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme in Somalia will require considerable assistance from the international community; synchronization with the development of the Joint Security Force; and a variety of approaches, including both traditional disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and less traditional community security and weapons-control programmes that take into account the complex situation in the country and lessons learned from previous United Nations efforts, in line with the integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standards. UNDP has initiated the planning of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration requirements for south-central Somalia with all the relevant partners. The Programme also supported the reintegraction of approximately 1,800 former security forces in “Somaliland” and “Puntland” and some 500 freelance militia members in Mogadishu. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration implementation and programming in south-central Somalia has since been suspended for security reasons. In line with resolution 1863 (2009), the technical assessment mission recommended that the immediate priority for UNPOS should be to build the capacity of the Joint Security Committee in the area of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, support the establishment of implementation bodies and facilitate early planning and public information, in coordination with UNDP.

Mine action

49. Mine action activities in southern and central Somalia, led by UNDP, have enjoyed relative success and acceptance from various parties on opposing sides. However, owing to the security situation, UNDP suspended activities in south-central Somalia late in 2008. UNDP is in the process of jointly implementing the mine action programme with the United Nations Mine Action Service, with a division of responsibility, under which the Mine Action Service will conduct mine action in south-central Somalia and UNDP will conduct mine action in “Puntland” and “Somaliland”. The Mine Action Service has assumed management of the mine action programme in south-central Somalia as from 6 February 2009, with a planned
transition period until 31 March. The programme will continue operating through the United Nations Office for Project Services from existing offices in Baidoa or an alternative location in the area, as security permits. UNDP activities in “Somaliland” and “Puntland” are currently ongoing.

C. Peacebuilding in “Somaliland” and “Puntland”

50. The technical assessment mission noted the ongoing significant activities of the United Nations country team in “Somaliland” and “Puntland” in the framework of the United Nations transition plan 2009/10. They include human rights monitoring and capacity-building; the training of prison officers and the construction of two model prisons; advanced work to train and develop the police; and capacity-building for ministries of the interior. While the focus of the Security Council is currently on developments in south-central Somalia, the mission noted the need to assist in consolidating the relative stability that the people of “Somaliland” and “Puntland” have shown a remarkable determination to preserve and sustain. To that end, the mission recommended that the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office consider using resources from the Peacebuilding Fund to expand the peace consolidation activities of the United Nations country team.

D. Maritime task force

51. In my letter of 19 December 2008, I indicated that one possibility for support to AMISOM and the peace process in Somalia would be a maritime task force, including a component that would have the capability of undertaking missions to Mogadishu. The force would be constituted in order to perform the following tasks: support AMISOM in extremis; support peace process activities by UNPOS; liaise with the Joint Security Force when established; assess the security situation; and gauge the acceptability of a land-based stabilization force. It would allow for the initial sea-basing of elements that could eventually be deployed as a land-based stabilization force and a follow-on United Nations peacekeeping operation.

52. After discussion with AMISOM, the technical assessment mission noted that if AMISOM capabilities are reinforced and improved as planned, there will be no need for a sea-basing capability. However, should the security situation deteriorate, the Council may wish to revisit the option. Meanwhile, there is an urgent need for AMISOM to be enhanced with maritime coastal capacity for the protection of transport and supply lines, as noted in my letter to the Council of 30 January 2009.

E. Contingency planning for a United Nations peacekeeping operation

53. With regard to the request by the Security Council for a report by 15 April on the possibility of establishing a United Nations peacekeeping operation, the technical assessment mission noted the need for basic conditions to be in place that would allow a peacekeeping operation to operate effectively. Important benchmarks would be (a) the formation of a Government of national unity in Somalia, inclusive beyond those represented in the Djibouti process; (b) the establishment and initial operation of the Joint Security Force in Mogadishu; (c) the implementation of a
credible ceasefire; (d) the lifting of illegal checkpoints; (e) active outreach by the parties to groups that remain outside the Djibouti process; (f) consent to the deployment by all the major parties; and (g) adequate pledges of troops and the required military capacities by Member States.

54. Paragraphs 55 to 68 below provide updated information on contingency planning for a peacekeeping operation that could be deployed in the event that the basic conditions for effective operation are in place, if so determined by the Security Council.

Military component

55. Under the contingency plan developed to date, the military component of the mission would be expected to contribute to the creation of a secure environment in support of the peace process and the restoration of State institutions throughout the country. Key military tasks would include the provision of support to the Joint Security Committee in monitoring the ceasefire and implementing the security arrangements established under the Djibouti agreement; the protection of United Nations personnel and assets; and support for a range of peacebuilding tasks, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, weapons control and elections. The end result would be the establishment of an inclusive, effective Administration throughout the country, with federal security institutions capable of assuming the minimum level of responsibility for the security of Somalia so as to allow for the phased withdrawal of the United Nations military component.

56. Military tasks related to support for humanitarian, reconstruction and development activities, including the securing of aid, the return of refugees and internally displaced persons and the protection of civilians, require further review. Humanitarian actors in Somalia have advised that, depending on the security conditions, involving peacekeepers in securing the delivery of humanitarian assistance could compromise humanitarian space and that a mandate for physical intervention to protect civilians could limit the ability of the force to be seen as impartial. Recommendations on those issues in the light of political and security developments will be covered in my April report.

57. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations estimates that, subject to the fine-tuning of specific tasks through the integrated mission planning process and an assessment on the ground, some 22,500 troops would be needed to operate in five brigade-sized sectors throughout southern and central Somalia. The starting point would be Mogadishu, where the force headquarters and two brigades would be deployed, comprising a composite brigade with one mechanized, one infantry and one marine battalion to secure the seaports and airports and provide key point protection; and a homogeneous brigade, consisting of three infantry battalions and three mechanized companies, as a rapid reaction force. An additional mechanized battalion would act as the theatre reserve. Four sectors will be supported by an aviation element comprising utility and attack helicopters. All five sectors would require combat and construction engineers.

58. A maritime component would be required, including logistics ships, a landing ship, inshore patrol boats and frigates to protect United Nations resupply and humanitarian aid shipping. Medical support would be provided by a level-II hospital per sector, with a level-III hospital in Mogadishu, and aeromedical evacuation capacity. Initially, all logistical support units would be military, transitioning to
civilian contracted positions as staff members were recruited and the local infrastructure rebuilt. Other support units would include military police; guard companies for each sector headquarters; well-drilling units; and explosive ordnance disposal and signals units.

**Logistics**

59. The initial support concept would be heavily dependent on use of military enablers. Initially, contracts put in place to support AMISOM would be expanded to provide support to the peacekeeping operation. Extensive use would be made of strategic maritime transportation to Somali ports, with forward distribution to sector administrative areas by military transportation and aviation assets. A support base is likely to be required outside Somalia in order to reduce the United Nations civilian footprint and to provide a secure staging area for supplies and equipment for the area of operations. Guaranteed and responsive protection from a maritime task force for commercial ships carrying United Nations supplies and equipment into Somali ports will be essential. All incoming troop- and police-contributing countries must be self-sustaining, with high-quality and robust contingent equipment. Ahead of the deployment, the United Nations Environment Programme should be requested to undertake an environmental impact assessment.

**Police component**

60. The peacekeeping operation would include a civilian police component, deployed on the basis of a secure environment provided by United Nations forces. The tasks of the police component would include mentoring, monitoring, advising and training the Somali Police Force in policing and law enforcement, complementing UNDP activity; advising and assisting Somali institutions on community policing, investigations, police reform, restructuring and rebuilding; and facilitating the provision of equipment and infrastructure. Subject to assessment on the ground, it is estimated that the United Nations police component would comprise as many as 1,500 individual police officers and 8 formed police units (140 personnel each), which would provide protection for United Nations personnel and equipment and perform joint patrols with the Somali Police Force.

**Civilian component**

61. The peacekeeping mission would include an appropriate civilian component, which could incorporate all the functions normally carried out by a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, subject to the needs of the peace process and with a view to complementing the existing activities of the United Nations country team. The precise tasks and functions of the civilian component and scope of operations would be dependent on the evolution of the peace process, as well as interaction with relevant national counterparts in Somalia. Accordingly, these will be identified and further developed through the integrated mission planning process and reflected in my April report.

**Transition concept**

62. It is envisaged that, subject to the basic conditions being met, and if so mandated by the Security Council, the United Nations peacekeeping operation would take over from AMISOM on the ground and would re-hat AMISOM
components. My April report will provide a detailed assessment and recommendations on whether the relevant conditions are in place at that time.

63. To develop the transition plan, the United Nations Force Commander and key planning staff for a mission headquarters would be recruited early so that they could participate in finalizing planning prior to their deployment to the field. United Nations start-up force elements will deploy to Mogadishu to work with AMISOM to effect the transfer of authority.

64. AMISOM forces that are United Nations-compliant could be re-hatted at the time of the transfer of authority. New military contingents would be deployed to replace or allow for the rotation of any non-United Nations-compliant AMISOM forces. Command would be transferred from an African Union to a United Nations operation when the United Nations mission headquarters reaches initial operating capability. During that initial phase, a standing police capacity team will deploy to the mission to, inter alia, coordinate the handover from the African Union police and prepare the ground for the deployment of the United Nations police. Police officers assigned to UNPOS will be absorbed.

65. The present security and humanitarian situation suggests that initial deployment should be to Sector 5 (Banadir district/Mogadishu) and Sector 4 (Shabelle districts), which includes the port of Merka and has a large population of internally displaced persons, followed by Sector 1 (Galgaduud and Mudug districts), which is the location of the larger camps for internally displaced persons, Sector 2 (Hiraan, Bay and Bakool districts), which is less secure and, finally, Sector 3 (Gedo and the two Juba districts), including Kismayo. The deployment sequence may change, depending on the security situation at the time and the availability of troops.

**Ongoing planning and alternative options**

66. The Secretariat will continuously update the deployment plans to take account of the developing situation on the ground and the needs of the political process. The concept of operations eventually decided upon and the final number of peacekeepers required will depend on those developments. Should the security situation improve, fewer robust capabilities and force protection elements would be required. In addition, the number of sectors would have to be adjusted according to the area of operations. For example, an additional sector could be created to cover "Puntland" if appropriate in the light of political developments.

67. Conversely, if the current security conditions do not improve but the Security Council nevertheless decides to deploy a United Nations peacekeeping operation, it will be necessary to establish a force with the more robust capabilities typical of a multinational force in order to carry out the mandate and protect itself. Such a United Nations force would require the military capabilities envisaged for the multinational stabilization force outlined in my report of 17 November 2008. In the event of a serious deterioration in the situation, the Council might choose to revisit other options, including that of a maritime task force.

68. In this regard, I note the views expressed by several Council members that no decision has yet been taken to deploy a United Nations peacekeeping operation and that such a decision will be made in the light of all the circumstances. Pending a decision by the Council, the Secretariat will continue to plan for all options. I will provide further recommendations, as appropriate, in my April report.
V. Activities of the United Nations and the international community

69. The International Contact Group on Somalia, under the chairmanship of my Special Representative, met in New York on 16 December. In the communiqué issued at the end of the meeting, the Contact Group, inter alia, expressed its serious concern at the continuing dispute between the leaders of the transitional federal institutions, and called on them to work together in the interests of peace and stability. The Group welcomed the declaration of 26 October on the formation of a unity Government and expanded Parliament, as well as the ceasefire agreement and the agreement of 24 November establishing a verification and monitoring mechanism for the ceasefire. It expressed appreciation for the important work of AMISOM and urged the international community to recognize the need to provide resources and material support to it. The Group further called on all parties to allow free and unhindered access for much-needed humanitarian aid; condemned piracy and stressed the need for a comprehensive approach to its underlying causes; and expressed deep concern about the human rights situation, while calling for an end to the continuing culture of impunity.

70. Since my previous report, the United Nations country team has reprioritized the transition plan as part of its effort to support and scale up recovery and development where feasible and complement ongoing humanitarian activities. The exercise concentrated on prioritizing activities in “Somaliland” and “Puntland” related to life-saving activities — those that contribute to the delivery of essential services or support for the preservation or enhancement of livelihoods, allow for security and institutional stability or address the issues of HIV/AIDS, gender and human rights in emergency-affected populations. It should be noted that by the end of December, approximately $147.8 million had been mobilized for recovery and development activities across Somalia, representing 76 per cent of the amount required to meet the transition plan targets for 2008.

VI. Humanitarian situation

71. The latest food security assessment, carried out during December 2008 and January 2009 by the Food Security Analysis Unit of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, confirmed that more than 3 million people in Somalia will continue to be in need of humanitarian assistance.

72. The central regions of Mudug and Galgaduud are the worst-affected areas, owing to the continued and worsening drought. The situation in those regions has been exacerbated by recent conflicts that have resulted in massive displacement, completely disrupted economic activities and limited access for humanitarian response efforts.

73. Nutrition assessments conducted in November and December 2008 confirm that rates of acute malnutrition in many parts of the country remain above emergency thresholds. The worst-affected areas continue to be the central, Gedo and Bakool regions, with a new area of concern along the coast of “Somaliland”. Internally displaced persons in Bossaso and Gaalkacyo continue to show high rates of acute malnutrition. However, some improvements in nutritional status have been recorded in the south, notably in the Shabelle regions, linked to a combination of
factors, including the large-scale humanitarian efforts, which must continue to be strengthened to prevent further deterioration. A near-normal deyr (rainy season) and decreasing prices for both imported and local food have led to the slight improvement. However, the cost of basic food and non-food items is still beyond the reach of many of the poor and most vulnerable urban populations.

74. Security constraints continued to hamper humanitarian operations across much of Somalia during the reporting period. A total of 34 aid workers were killed in Somalia in 2008; 26 were abducted, of whom 13 were still in captivity as at the end of January 2009.

75. During the first week of January, two WFP staff members were brutally murdered in southern Somalia while monitoring the distribution of food aid. Thereafter, the Programme made a decision to continue operations until all the food aid in south-central Somalia (57,000 tons) had been distributed, demanding a written guarantee of a secure operating environment from all regions in south-central Somalia. Without such a guarantee, operations in that particular area would cease, which would have a significant impact, given that in 2008 WFP shipped nearly 260,000 tons of food to Somalia — almost four times the 2007 amount — reaching more than 1.5 million Somalis with food aid every month.

76. It is anticipated that internally displaced persons will return to Mogadishu in the coming months, albeit in small numbers. During January 2009, more than 16,000 internally displaced persons returned to the city. Daily prepared-food assistance continues for 80,000 at-risk beneficiaries.

77. Despite the returns, the security situation in the city remains extremely volatile. During the last week of January, some 10,000 civilians fled Dharkanley and Wadajir districts in north-eastern Mogadishu to escape advancing Islamist militias. Most of those displaced have moved to other neighbourhoods within Mogadishu or to the outskirts of the city. Thousands of the city’s residents who remain in sites for internally displaced persons outside Mogadishu are reluctant or afraid to return to their homes, deterred by the lack of water, sanitation and health services and the threat of renewed fighting in Mogadishu. Some have seen their houses destroyed or pillaged and are wary of the dangers of the landmines and unexploded ordnance littering the capital. Others are victims of previous conflicts, uprooted from settlements for internally displaced persons within Mogadishu, and have no homes to which to return.

78. Given the general lack of security and limited assistance in Mogadishu, a mass return is not expected. Consequently, humanitarian agencies will continue with their current level of assistance, particularly in the Afgoye corridor and in the central regions.

79. Support to the 580,000 internally displaced persons in the Mogadishu-Afgoye corridor continued during the last quarter of 2008. WFP provided monthly food rations targeting 400,000 people. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and partners provided 180,000 internally displaced persons and their host communities with safe water, which was trucked in on a daily basis; improved sanitation conditions; and promoted hygiene. UNICEF is also supporting the establishment of permanent water systems to replace the trucking operation, which is not sustainable.
80. Through local and international non-governmental organizations, UNICEF continued to provide emergency education to displaced children living in settlements along the Afgoye corridor and on the outskirts of Mogadishu. In those areas, more than 7,000 new internally displaced students, 3,400 of them girls, gained access to education as a result of the provision of 43 additional classrooms (traditional construction and tented). Overall, approximately 14,000 new internally displaced students were enrolled in emergency schools in Afgoye and Mogadishu in 2008, representing a 200 per cent increase in enrolment from 2007.

81. The 2008 humanitarian appeal for Somalia was 71 per cent funded as of January 2009. By the end of 2008, the Humanitarian Response Fund had allocated more than $14 million to 51 projects, of which 62 per cent were implemented by local Somali non-governmental organizations, either directly or in partnership with international organizations. Some $11.7 million from the Central Emergency Response Fund was allocated to Somalia in 2008 to provide urgent life-saving interventions in the areas of water, sanitation, nutrition, health, logistics and livelihood support for internally displaced persons and impoverished populations.

82. The 2009 consolidated appeal for Somalia, which was launched in December 2008, seeks to provide urgent assistance and protection to some 3.2 million people, including the more than 1 million people displaced from Mogadishu and other areas in south-central Somalia. The increase in the scope and funding size of the Somalia appeal from $662 million in 2008 to $918 million in 2009 reflects not only the drastic increase in the number of people in need, but also the sharp rise in commodity and delivery costs for Somalia.

VII. Human rights and protection of civilians

83. I am still concerned about the fact that, despite the political progress that is being made, targeted killings of persons linked to the Transitional Federal Government, the Islamic Courts Union, the United Nations and civil society organizations have continued. I therefore appeal to the authorities to ensure respect for human rights when setting up an integrated transitional force and an expanded police force, including to taking measures for the protection of civilians, as well as holding accountable the perpetrators of abuse.

84. Since November 2008, UNPOS has received reports of 10 targeted killings, including that of the Deputy Minister for Reconciliation, a member of the National Reconciliation Commission and one civil society activist. All parties to the conflict continue to violate freedom of expression. On 1 January, a journalist was shot at point-blank range on the outskirts of Mogadishu, allegedly by a militia with links to senior officials in the Transitional Federal Government. The director of Radio HornAfrik was also shot dead on 3 February on his way to a press conference called by Al-Shabaab. Media outlets were shut down in Kismayo in December 2008. Journalists continue to face intimidation, arbitrary arrest, detention and sentencing without due process.

85. In the two months following the announcement by Ethiopia of the withdrawal of its forces from Somalia, reports of civilians killed in crossfire or during indiscriminate attacks increased sharply. Civilians alleged to have links with the Ethiopian forces, including translators and women selling food to soldiers, were killed in seven incidents. In one incident in 2009, a car bomb targeting AMISOM
killed some 20 individuals, including women and children. AMISOM denied accusations that it had killed 5 civilians when it returned fire in retaliation. At least 13 individuals, believed to be mostly civilians, were killed on 2 February when another bomb targeting AMISOM exploded and there was an ensuing gunfire. AMISOM has established a board of inquiry to investigate whether its troops used excessive force, as alleged in some reports.

86. Most of the violations and abuses were committed with impunity. My Special Representative has repeatedly highlighted the need to end impunity for past and ongoing abuses. In November, UNPOS, with the support of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, organized a two-day workshop on justice and reconciliation for the High-level Committee. It culminated in an agreement to set up a joint working group to examine the possibility of setting up a commission of inquiry, special tribunal or other mechanism. Although the working group has yet to start work, the agreement marked an important step in beginning consultations on this critical issue.

87. Despite the extremely difficult security situation on the ground, human rights defenders in Somalia continued to conduct activities for the promotion and protection of human rights. Several organizations conducted events for the commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Two non-governmental women's rights organizations, Save Somali Women and Children and HIDA, received human rights awards in Sweden and France, respectively.

88. The monitoring of violations of children's rights has been difficult within Somalia, in particular the monitoring and reporting of the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict. Monitors have been concerned that the reporting of recruitment activities might endanger their safety following death threats issued in July and August 2008. As of December, 10 boys were known to have been recruited and used in armed conflict or policing activities. Three of the boys were provided with assistance, enabling them to leave their duties, and three died; in two instances, child recruitment was denounced publicly, and in one instance, the child involved was given psychosocial support. In the period from October to December 2008, 55 reports were compiled of children killed in the conflict, mostly as a result of crossfire and indiscriminate fire; 59 children were maimed. In the same period, 40 girls were reported to have been raped, 18 of whom accessed medical assistance from medical centres or birthing assistants and 10 of whom accessed psychosocial support; 17 cases were referred to the police and/or the traditional legal system. Not all of the cases of rape referred to legal systems have had a satisfactory outcome. One young girl who was raped was accused of adultery and stoned to death in front of a crowd of people, and other girls have been forced to marry the perpetrators. During the period, partners working in the area of child protection, in particular in the Afgooye corridor and Kismayo, have experienced hostility from militias. All of those violations of human rights and international humanitarian law were committed with total impunity.

89. From 22 November to 2 December, the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia undertook his second field visit to the Horn of Africa subregion and Yemen with a view to updating the Human Rights Council at its tenth session on new developments relating to Somalia. However, owing to security constraints, he was not able to visit Somalia and instead focused on neighbouring
countries, including Kenya, Djibouti and Yemen, where he talked to newly arrived Somali refugees. The findings of the report will be shared with the Human Rights Council on 25 March 2009.

90. Despite its small size, the UNPOS Human Rights Unit has a strong monitoring and protection mandate, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1814 (2008), by which the Secretary-General is required to establish effective capacity within UNPOS to monitor and enhance the protection of human rights in Somalia. The need for all forces and parties to respect human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as to protect civilians, was reiterated in resolution 1863 (2009). The Human Rights Unit has conducted several missions to various parts of Somalia and is also providing technical support to the Joint Security Committee and the High-level Committee established by the Djibouti agreement, which is chaired by the United Nations. The main task of the High-level Committee is to address challenges related to political, justice and reconciliation issues and the convening of a conference on those issues.

## VIII. Operational activities to support peace

### Institution-building

91. The United Nations continued to provide support to Somalia for institutional development and capacity-building. The provision of such support has been consolidated into the Somali institutional development project, a single, comprehensive framework, which was launched in January 2009. It focuses on four areas of support: policy and law-making processes; budget-making and public finance management; human resource development; and infrastructure support.

92. Under the start-up package project, which is designed to provide critical operational means to the transitional federal institutions to enable them to perform key functions, undertake priority interventions and carry out their mandate according to the provisions of the Transitional Federal Charter, the United Nations continued with the rehabilitation of the two Government buildings in Mogadishu, the Prime Minister’s Office and the Police Academy. It also supported the internal and international travel of key Government officials. During the reporting period, the project was not able to ensure stipend payments to counterparts, which is one of the key support components, because of restrictions from some of the main project donors. The funds from the Governments of Norway and Sweden were, however, used to clear stipend arrears from the previous months.

93. The United Nations continued to support the constitutional process with its national and international partners. A series of capacity-building workshops were organized for the Independent Federal Constitutional Commission. During the workshops, the Constitutions of 1960 and 1990 were reviewed and compared in the context of the 2004 Transitional Federal Charter with a view to laying the groundwork for the development of a road map outlining options which might be considered for inclusion in a new Constitution. A conference on the theme “Federalism and decentralization: options for Somalia” was held in Nairobi from 27 to 29 November 2008. It brought together nearly 200 Somalis, including experts on international and national issues, diaspora and politicians, including members of the opposition, for a broad-based discussion on the future of Somalia. The key participants in the conference included the former Prime Minister, Nur Hassan
Hussein, and the Chairman of the Central Committee of ARS, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan. The conference produced key recommendations on the way forward. The United Nations also assisted the Ministry of Constitutional and Federal Affairs in drafting the bill establishing the Somali Electoral Commission and the State Boundary and Demarcation Commission.

Local governance and decentralized service delivery for safe water, sanitation and hygiene education

94. Activities in the areas of local governance, basic services and assistance to internally displaced persons are increasingly implemented through United Nations joint programmes. The United Nations Human Settlements Programme, UNDP, UNICEF, the International Labour Organization and the United Nations Capital Development Fund are partners in the joint programme on local governance and decentralized service delivery, which started work in April 2008 and will coordinate relevant United Nations activities until 2012. The United Nations is making every effort to ensure that the very positive experiences of the Somali urban development programme, the numerous lessons learned and the partnerships built will be adopted and expanded under the Joint Programme for the benefit of the Somali people.

95. Work to expand the Bossaso water supply system, which serves an estimated population of 120,000, and to rehabilitate the Baidoa water supply system (to serve 40,000 people) was contracted out and initiated. Rehabilitation work for the Berbera water system was completed, facilitating enhanced access (a 30 per cent increase in supply) to drinking water for 12,000 inhabitants of the town. Work also began on the establishment of a sustainable management system, under a public-private partnership, for the Berbera water system, with a stakeholders' workshop being held in Berbera from 20 to 22 January. The establishment of a similar management structure for the Baidoa water system made good progress, with the establishment of a water board, the formation of a private water company (Warjana) and the floating of shares to the public.

96. In the Togdheer, Sanaag, Awdal, Hargeisa and Sahil regions, five water yards and four motorized shallow wells were rehabilitated. In total, they serve 33,000 people. Five shallow wells were equipped with solar motors and now provide adequate water services to an estimated 10,000 people. A total of 7,500 pupils in 30 schools in all regions of "Somaliland" benefited from the construction of latrines and hand-washing facilities. In all, 60 teachers and 60 community education committees were provided with public hygiene and sanitation training within the same schools.

Security and the rule of law

97. Following the enactment, in April 2008, of the "Somaliland" Justice Law No. 36/2007, some 104 children ranging from 15 to 18 years of age were released from eight prisons in "Somaliland" on 21 October. Many of the children had been imprisoned on charges of truancy and disobeying their parents. Upon their release, the children were provided with reintegration services, clothing, food allowances and transport back to their communities through the Justice for Children Project, a joint United Nations effort.

98. Technical and capacity-building support for the Joint Security Committee continued, including the development of a professional civilian-based police force
for Somalia and the implementation of the peace process provisions relating to the formation of a joint police force. Late in November 2008, the United Nations facilitated a Joint Security Committee workshop with high-level participation from the Transitional Federal Government and ARS. The aim was to equip the participants with a common understanding of the basic concepts, terminology and modalities relating to the cessation of armed conflict and commence planning for transitional security arrangements, among other tasks.

99. The United Nations also increased its support to ensure the further professionalization of the special police units in “Puntland” and “Somaliland”.

100. Assistance in law enforcement continued to be matched with activities in support of the justice and correctional centres. Assistance agreements were renewed with the “Somaliland” Women’s Association, legal aid clinics in Mogadishu, the Bar Association of “Somaliland”, the law faculties of the University of Mogadishu, “Puntland” State University, the University of Hargeisa and the University of Amond and the police advisory committees in Mogadishu. Support to the ministries of justice continued in the form of infrastructure and training.

Basic services: health, including maternal and child health, child survival and education

101. Child Health Days, a community-based package of essential high-impact health services to be conducted nationwide every six months, aimed at reaching over 1.5 million children under the age of 5 and at least 1 million women of child-bearing age — whose implementation had been delayed owing to insecurity and limited capacity on the ground — was launched in “Somaliland” on 25 December. Preparations are under way to carry out the campaign in “Puntland” and south-central Somalia as early as February, if security conditions allow.

102. The intervention would provide assistance in the areas of child immunization against measles, diphtheria, whooping cough, tetanus and polio; vitamin A supplementation; nutritional assessments; de-worming; the distribution of oral rehydration salts and water purification tablets; the promotion of breastfeeding; and tetanus toxoid vaccination of girls and women aged 15 to 49.

103. During the reporting period, 370 head teachers from Bay, Bakool and Gedo regions received training on the Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, school management and administration, psychology and education information systems, benefiting over 70,000 children. The training was integrated with awareness-raising sessions in the areas of nutrition and HIV/AIDS. In addition, 272 head teachers were trained in Jamaame, Lower Juba, and 191 non-formal teachers were trained in Merka. In “Somaliland” and “Puntland”, two-week training courses on pedagogy and management skills were provided for 200 non-formal education teachers and 260 formal teachers, benefiting 18,000 children and young people.

104. The United Nations supported the rehabilitation of eight Koranic schools in “Puntland” and “Somaliland”, and it is improving the quality of teaching in those schools through teacher training, benefiting more than 900 students, including 380 girls. In addition, the eight Koranic schools were supplied with teaching and learning materials, including textbooks and school supplies.
Livelihoods and food security

105. The United Nations supported the "Puntland" Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Management Agency in undertaking emergency preparedness and response training from 12 to 15 October for 30 Government officials and selected partners towards a better understanding of the importance of disaster/emergency preparedness and response planning for "Puntland". Participants were also trained on the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response and the UNICEF core commitments for children in emergencies. As a result, emergency preparedness response plan committees/task forces were established, membership determined and terms of reference developed for all levels (national, regional and district). Rapid assessment tools were reviewed and revised as needed, and "Puntland" disaster preparedness and response plans focusing on basic services were also drafted.

106. The United Nations has generated short-term employment for more than 21,000 workers in south-central Somalia over the past three months, equivalent to approximately 600,000 workdays. More than 35 per cent of the workers are women, and 25 per cent are internally displaced persons. Employment was generated through the labour-intensive rehabilitation and upgrading of basic, social and productive infrastructure, which, in turn, is diversifying the livelihood opportunities for communities. The interventions are being carried out through a partnership with local non-governmental organizations and community-based organizations, while local private firms ensure monitoring and oversight.

HIV/AIDS and sexual and gender-based violence

107. The Woman to Woman initiative on HIV/AIDS prevention for women and young girls is being implemented in eight regions in south-central Somalia. The main aims of the initiative are knowledge- and skills-building, stigma reduction and the provision of care, support and treatment to people living with HIV/AIDS, in particular vulnerable women and young girls. In the period from October to December 2008, an estimated 5,825 women and young girls were reached through 221 forums on HIV/AIDS awareness, with the aim of improving their knowledge and skills in the area of HIV/AIDS prevention. In addition, 242 households were visited and 1,967 family members have been reached and provided with basic information on the prevention of HIV/AIDS and family education, including hygiene and sanitation and mother and child health.

IX. Observations

108. I am encouraged by the determination of the people and leaders of Somalia to carry on with the reconciliation process. The expansion of Parliament and the subsequent peaceful election of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as the new interim President is clear testimony of the commitment of the parties to move forward with national reconciliation. While congratulating President Ahmed, I called on him to leave the door open to other groups which currently remain outside the Djibouti process.

109. I am pleased in this regard to note that President Ahmed has already stated his intention to reach out to those groups which are opposed to the Djibouti process. My Special Representative, regional leaders, Somali religious leaders and elders and the rest of the international community have similarly encouraged those groups to seize
the moment and join in the international effort in pursuit of bringing peace to Somalia. I therefore urge all the people of Somalia to embrace the spirit of forgiveness and compromise and put the past behind them for the sake of peace and reconciliation.

110. Admittedly, many challenges lie ahead of us. The simmering conflict between the forces of peace and those opposed to peace is just one example of those hurdles. The instability generated by the fighting, ongoing abductions and a general atmosphere of fear continue to impede the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance to the many people who need it. I therefore pay tribute to all the organizations and personnel involved in the delivery of humanitarian assistance in the country; they continue to discharge their responsibilities in an extremely dangerous and stressful environment. I wish to assure them that the international community is fully aware of the immense sacrifices they are making in an effort to better the lives of many suffering people in Somalia.

111. I am encouraged, in this regard, by the response of the international community in combating the scourge of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Although the problem of piracy will not go away without a comprehensive resolution of the country’s political and security crisis, the current international effort has alleviated the scourge. The international community, however, must provide the necessary leadership and resources to help bring stability to Somalia. I appeal to the donor community for the immediate release of such resources to support current efforts by the parties to set up a Joint Security Force and effective Government machinery. This will help eliminate the continuing threat of piracy, which impedes the flow of humanitarian assistance to a substantial segment of the population in dire need.

112. I am deeply concerned about the human rights situation in Somalia, which continues to be precarious, especially in the context of the ongoing conflict. The dire human rights situation is having a negative impact on the lives of civilians, including children and other vulnerable groups. I again urge all parties to put a stop to acts of violence, including violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. I further welcome the agreement reached by the High-level Committee to set up a working group to look into the possibility of establishing a commission of inquiry in cases of impunity and the perpetration of abuse.

113. I also welcome the completion by Ethiopia of the withdrawal of its forces from Somalia, in fulfilment of the ceasefire agreement. The continued hostilities being perpetrated by anti-peace elements in the face of the Ethiopian withdrawal seem to show that such groups do not have a serious agenda, other than seeking to wreak havoc among innocent people. I would like, in this regard, to express my appreciation to AMISOM for the commitment with which its forces continue to operate in Somalia under very difficult conditions. I further wish to assure AMISOM that the sacrifices it is making are not in vain. I call on those States members of the African Union which have pledged troops to make arrangements for their deployment without further delay. At the same time, I call on the international community to provide resources, both in the short and long term, in support of AMISOM.

114. The proposed support to AMISOM and assistance in building the Somali security and rule-of-law institutions, together with the efforts of my Special Representative on the political front and the ongoing activities of the United Nations country team, all constitute key elements of a comprehensive United Nations strategy to address the crisis in Somalia. The main objectives of that strategic
approach are: (a) to enable AMISOM to sustain its operation, attain its authorized full strength of 8,000 troops and 270 police personnel and bring its contingents up to United Nations standards; (b) to give AMISOM and the Somali security institutions the capacity to create a minimum level of security that would enable the Djibouti peace process, and UNPOS, to relocate to Somalia; and (c) to create an environment that mitigates the challenges and risks facing the United Nations country team and other humanitarian actors currently operating in Mogadishu, and to promote respect for human rights.

115. This represents a new approach to supporting the evolving peace process. Delivery of this new strategy requires a strong partnership among the United Nations system, the African Union, Member States and the Somali parties. As requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1863 (2009), I intend to convene a donors' conference in the coming days to solicit contributions to the trust funds for AMISOM and the capacity-building of Somali institutions, and request Member States to contribute generously. I also encourage Member States to continue to support peacebuilding activities in “Somaliland” and “Puntland”.

116. I envisage that, with the support of all partners, the steps outlined in my letter of 19 December 2008 (S/2008/804) would take Somalia to a stage where it could benefit from the deployment of a multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation that would take over from AMISOM, expand operations beyond Mogadishu and work together with other partners to build the Somali State. In this regard, it is important that all the conditions necessary for a peacekeeping operation to be effective be in place. At the same time, I note that the Council has not yet made a decision to deploy a peacekeeping operation, and that there remains uncertainty about whether peacekeeping is the right tool to support the political process in Somalia. As requested in resolution 1863 (2009), I intend to provide further advice and recommendations on the deployment of a peacekeeping operation by 15 April. In the interim, the Secretariat will continue to update and refine the contingency plan for a United Nations peacekeeping operation within the framework of the integrated mission planning process.

117. The efforts of the international community need to be fully complemented by the people of Somalia themselves. Ultimately, durable peace and stability is the primary responsibility of the parties and all other people of Somalia, whether they live within the borders or are currently in the diaspora. I am encouraged, therefore, by the commitment of the parties and some local leaders to the cause of national reconciliation. I urge the new Somali Administration to leave no stone unturned in putting together effective structures of government, fully establishing itself within Somalia to restore stability and moving forward to consolidate the gains it has achieved through the Djibouti process. The United Nations and the rest of the international community stand ready to assist the parties in their pursuit of national reconciliation.

118. Finally, I would like to express my deep appreciation to my Special Representative, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, who continues to work tirelessly to advance the cause of peace and reconciliation among the people of Somalia. I also pay tribute to all personnel, both international and national staff, who are working under difficult conditions in the interests of peace. I call on the Somali people and Member States to continue rendering my Special Representative their unwavering support and cooperation.