Statement to the UN Security Council by SRSG Augustine Mahiga

30 November 2010

Mr President

First let me apologise for speaking to you by VTC (Video tele-conference). I would have preferred to attend this vital Security Council meeting in person, but as you are all aware we have been involved in a political crisis in Somalia, first to get confirmation of the Prime Minister and second to get the new Cabinet ratified by the Somali Parliament. Both entailed intense diplomatic and political facilitation on my part. I judged that as the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, I had to be here in the Region where I can influence the turn of events at first hand.

Mr President

You will be aware that the Transitional Federal Institutions of Somalia have been in a state of internal crisis for several months which had almost paralysed the Government and hindered our ability to assist the Transitional Government to define and undertake key tasks of the remaining nine months of this transitional period.

Mr President

I am pleased to report that last weekend we finally achieved parliamentary endorsement of the Cabinet of the new Prime Minister, Mr. Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed. The endorsement of the Cabinet coincided with the first deployment of UNPOS staff in Mogadishu. UNPOS representatives had the privilege of addressing the Cabinet the following day. The 18 member Cabinet is leaner than any other TFG Cabinet before it. It is also more technocratic in profile. With nine months left to the end of the Transition and after a prolonged period of instability, I cannot underscore enough the need for the international community to work together to help stabilize the current Transitional Federal Government and others state institutions. It is my sincere hope that with this crisis behind us we can make progress on several fronts.

A request was made to the Transitional Federal Government at the last meeting of the International Contact Group in Madrid in September, to come up with a Road Map for managing this final period of the Transition. I have raised this matter with President Sheikh Sharif and Prime Minister Mohamed during my last visit to Mogadishu earlier this month and on the significance of the Road Map in ending the transition. I am glad to announce that the Prime Minister has presented to me a draft of the TFG Road Map exactly sixty days on the deadline set in Madrid. The draft Road Map focuses on political reach out, reconciliation, security, good governance and a new political dispensation after August 11, 2011.

I believe that we as the International Community, must also lay out to the TFG how we see this transition period coming to an end and what lies beyond August 2011. Let me start with how I see the situation unfold in coming months. The end-state we are striving to achieve is
for all local, regional and clan based administrations across the whole of Somalia to engage with the TFG on an inclusive process to define the framework of the future political dispensation, based on agreed principles derived from the constitution making process, elements of which has been drafted and to be reviewed by Somali and international experts under the guidance of an Independent Constitutional Commission.

Mr President

The first step in this process is to ensure that the unity and stability of this government by enhancing UNPOS political interaction on the ground between the TFG, Parliament and civil society, second, is to build up capacity, image and effectiveness of the TFG to enable it to institutionalize legitimacy awarded to it by Parliament and the protection provided to its institutions by AMISOM in a strategic way.

The key to the restoration of durable peace and security in Somalia rests with the establishment of functional state institutions. In this regard, efforts need to be made to operationalise, on an urgent basis, key ministries. This does not mean only rehabilitating the building and putting in place the equipment that they lack, but also staffing them with effective civil servants, and tapping professional human resources from Somalia’s broad-ranging Diaspora. To make the TFG functional in Somalia, we need to make the Ministries work as quickly as possible and move away from the practice of having Ministers without Ministries.

The other simultaneous strategy should be to broaden political outreach to regional and local administrations outside Mogadishu. My international colleagues, who support me here in Nairobi and I are starting to work in consultation with the TFG on what form of government we see coming after the end of this transitional period in August. So far the TFG has had limited success in engaging with those who were not represented at Djibouti. We have started to see attempts by a number of regional authorities to try and take control of their own destinies in a similar way to Somaliland and Puntland. There are new administrations in Galmadug and in Heeb and Hiraan. All of these regions need to be engaged not just by the International Community in their dual track approach, but also by the TFG in order to seek a broader acceptance of the Draft Constitution which is under discussion now. Dialogue with the regions is an excellent way of reaching out to the wider Somalia and my office will support talks between regions and groups who wish to follow the path of peace and reconciliation. In these processes we will encourage the TFG to join and be part of the discussions. I have no wish to see partition or the return of regional warlords, but we will support islands of stability in Somalia.

UNPOS has prepared an overall political and civilian strategy for Somalia with a priority focus on broadening the political base for reconciliation reaching out to regional and local administrations, institution capacity building, enhancing TFG legitimacy, constitutional consultations and formation of successor political arrangements. Following my visit to the autonomous administrations of Puntland and Somaliland, UNPOS has deployed an advance political coordinator to the two Administrations. Accommodation and Office Space has been
identified and is being furnished. The staff have been assigned to Hargeisa in Somaliland and Garowe in Puntland.

I am also reactivating the Kampala Process in early 2011 to foster dialogue on Piracy (and any other subjects they care to discuss) between the Somali regional administrations and to use similar fora to address issues of common concern such as shared resources, health issues and population movements. The Galkayo Agreement between the TFG and Puntland Administration will also be reactivated for implementation early next year.

Mr President

While there are multiple challenges facing Somalia and there is a need to have a comprehensive strategy that addresses all issues, one of the priorities is what to do about Mogadishu. Mogadishu is the capital of Somalia. It is the seat of Government, it is where AMISOM is deployed and it is the scene of fierce clashes between forces that support the Government and those who oppose it. Any realistic, political and security approach aimed at stabilizing Somalia, should address the challenges in Mogadishu as a priority phase.

This limited strategic objective can be better achieved if we focus all security, political and recovery/humanitarian efforts on Mogadishu. Being the capital city with roughly 2 million people, Mogadishu represents the most important metropolis in southern Somalia.

Council members will recall that the Djibouti Agreement envisaged simultaneous progress in the political peace process, security, reconstruction, development and humanitarian pillars. These are the pillars on which a strategy for Mogadishu will have to be based. AMISOM is a peace support operation whose primary function is to support the security sector institutions of the TFG. These need to be built up. It is not useful just to train Somali security forces and police, they have to be paid and properly equipped; proper command and control has to be put in place; as well as structures, which can transform militiamen into professional soldiers and policemen. As we begin to operationalise the TFG forces and provide the necessary support and mentoring through AMISOM, any military approach that they adopt has to be aligned to the political strategy I have outlined.

One of the issues we have to pay close intention to is the protection of civilians. Already too many civilians have tragically died in the crossfire between forces supporting the Government and those who oppose it. We need to provide AMISOM with the means to avoid such unnecessary casualties. However, the TFG also has to maintain discipline within the ranks of its security forces and to ensure that their personnel do not extort or harm civilians. The international community should help the TFG to retain its fighting force by improving the discipline and morale of the fighters.

Translating this strategy to become a Mogadishu specific strategy will entail the TFG working with existing political and administrative structures. They include working with the Benadir (Greater Mogadishu) Administration, the Office of the Mayor, District Commissioners in the areas under the TFG, clan and religious leaders as well as community
based organizations and the business community. With light foot presence in Mogadishu, UNPOS has started consultations on this front.

The political strategy for Mogadishu has to be based on a series of approaches. The first, as laid out in the Djibouti Agreement, is outreach and reconciliation. Mogadishu has been a city at war with itself for two decades. It is awash with arms and militias and there are interests in Mogadishu which see the continuation of the conflict and chaos in their political and financial interests. For those that stand in the way of peace and reconciliation in Mogadishu, the Security Council needs to send a strong signal that this will no longer be tolerated. For those individuals, elements and groups who want to work with the TFG to promote peace in the city, we the international community have to find ways to facilitate cooperation between them and the TFG. We need to ensure that all elements in Mogadishu that support the peace process are working together not at cross purposes, which has often been the case in the past.

Real peace will not begin to arrive in the city until its citizens begin to see its dividends. The government, with the support of AMISOM and the international community has to redouble its efforts to provide basic services to the districts of Mogadishu under its control and extend to other areas of the city when the TFG extends its control over them. Provision of basic services should not only include the provision of food, sanitation and clean drinking water. It also includes rehabilitation and effective operationalisation of most of the hospitals and medical facilities, and the reopening of educational institutions. It includes, above all, an economic strategy to generate incomes and employment and a wean away Somali youth from the conflict.

Thus far the conflict has been the main employer of the youth in Somalia, especially in Mogadishu. We have to wean them away from the conflict and divert their energies towards more productive activities. Hence, No political or military approaches in Mogadishu and indeed in other parts of Somalia can fully succeed without an underpinning reconstruction and development plan to support them. This pillar of the Djibouti Agreement was underscored in the Istanbul Conference in May this year. As peace and stability is consolidated, UNPOS is consulting with various stakeholders including the Arab-African Initiative based in Cairo to organize a follow up to the Istanbul Conference in the first quarter of 2011. The Somali business community is vibrant internationally and the Diaspora sends at least $1 billion dollars to Somalia in remittances. Their involvement and support is critical. We need to work with both to help generate more economic activities in Somalia and help kick-start recovery activities in Mogadishu, Puntland and Somaliland.

Mr President

I fully support the African Union’s plan to increase AMISOM’s capacity to 12,000 to operationalise some of the political objectives I have outlined above today. The opportunity to take control of Mogadishu and sustain that control, allows increased presence of the UN and other supporting entities in Mogadishu. In addition to enhancing support to the rebuilding of the Somalia security institutions, this presence should be focusing on supporting the consolidation of the economic base of the TFG in Mogadishu; and the commencement of
basic delivery of services by the TFG to the population as well as delivery of humanitarian assistance to the needy who happen to have their largest congregation in Banadir. This first step should be reviewed within 12 months; the duration of the mandate of AMISOM. Securing Mogadishu and the Banadir region is the gateway to securing the greater South-Central Somalia in the next phase as Garowe in Puntland is now the stepping stone of the local administrations in the Central Region. I believe that securing Mogadishu by pushing out the Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu will change the whole military and geo-political dynamics in South Central Somalia. If this is to happen, it will also be necessary to equip AMISOM with key enablers such as a rapid reaction force with support helicopters so that we can reach out to other Somali regions and enable the consultation and reconciliation process to begin in earnest and provide security to enable UN, TFG and others to talk to the regional actors.

Mr President

I commend the TFIs for approving the new Cabinet and I am cautiously optimistic that we can take this process forward but for that to have any chance of success I need a stronger AMISOM, an invigorated Security Sector and institutional reform process but most of all I need a full commitment of the Somali government, the regional administrations of Somalia and the International Community to work together. With so little time left I encourage the Council to approve this uplift to AMISOM and to support the logistic packages that are required to make the uplift achievable as quickly as possible. Also, Mr. President allow me to thank all stakeholders and partners of the TFG in the international community and regional actors such as the African Union, IGAD, the European Union, the League of Arab States and individual member states for their support to the TFIs and the United Nations in Somalia. I wish to encourage them to preserver in this path of partnership to achieve peace, stability, recovery and development in Somalia.

Finally Mr President

I would like to conclude with a few words about integration of the UN effort in Somalia. Coordination between UNPOS and the UN Country Team continues to improve. We have agreed to a phased approach through which we will further strengthen both policy and operational coordination. This includes the development of an Integrated Strategic Framework in 2011, for which preparatory work has begun. These are among the steps that will facilitate our transition towards an integrated office in the coming months. In this regard, I would like to reassure Council members and humanitarian colleagues that I am committed to ensuring humanitarian action and Humanitarian space will be safeguarded within the new structure. I am confident that an integrated architecture will improve the collective impact of the UN and contribute positively to the restoration of some level of normalcy in Somalia. It will also enhance the coherence and integrity of the United Nations as an honest broker in the peace process for Somalia.

Thank You.